Exhibit Project
R & D Planning Page - Segment 6
| 6. Then even more detail on the actual "Crossing of the Dan" involving Dix's
Ferry, Irvin's Ferry, and Boyd's Ferry.
Summary: 13-14 February. On the 13th, Greene, with the main army, crossed the Dan River at Irwin’s Ferry, thanks to the prior collection of boats by Lieut. Col. Edward Carrington, and a survey of the river made by Capt. John Smith of the Maryland line. Cornwallis continued following hard on the heels of the Americans, occasionally coming into open sight of Lee and William’s light detachment. Before sunset of the 14th, William’s passed over downriver at Irwin’s Ferry. Lee’s troops soon followed at the same location. The last of them, after recapturing some of horses who had fled at being forced to swim the river, themselves had crossed the Dan after 9 pm. "The men were loaded in boats, but the luckless horses were turned into the flood to swim for it. Some in panic swam back to the Carolina shore and made for the woods. Lee sent the weary men to round them up. When all were secured, he and the rear troop crossed the Dan in the last boat." Lieut. Col. Carrington, who had been personally superintending the crossings, and Lieut. Col. Lee, were among the very last to make the passage. When the van of Cornwallis’ army reached Irwin’s, six hours after the last group of Americans had made it across, Greene’s men cheered -- which the soldiers of O’Hara’s advance column were close enough to have heard. Cornwallis had earlier calculated that Greene would have had to cross at the fords up the river, and in an effort to trap him had maneuvered his force towards the west, not expecting that Greene would be able to cross at Irwin’s or Boyd’s in time to escape (to the east.) |
• I think we need to establish just who was at the Irvin's Ferry crossing site and who was at the Boyd's Ferry crossing site.
6.1 Reference: Edward Carrington
As noted at NG to Nash, 9 February (PGNG, 7: 263-265), Lord Cornwallis thought NG would have to cross the Dan at one of the ferries higher up the river. NG decided to attempt a crossing much farther downstream at Boyd's Ferry, however, after consulting with his quartermaster, Edward Carrington, who had earlier supervised a survey of the river. (See PGNG, 6: 512, 514n.) Carrington recalled in 1809 that "when the retreat was determined on, it was predicated on the certain knowledge, that there was but one boat at Dixon's [Dix's] ferry, from which place, Cornwallis well prepared for rapid movement, was not much more distant than Greene, and that between there and Boyd's ferry inclusive, five more were to be found.... There were then no other boats in the river, other than the wide and shallow flats at the ferries, which it was impossible to carry against the current." (Quoted in Lee, Campaign of 1781, pp. 116-17)
6.2 Greene split off a detachment of light troops under Williams to throw off Cornwallis. They suffered terrible hardships, and started to cross the Dan on the evening of Feb 14 (after the main troops had crossed on the 13th). "The men were loaded in boats, but the luckless horses were turned into the flood to swim for it. Some in panic swam back to the Carolina shore and made for the woods. Lee sent the weary men to round them up. When all were secured, he and the rear troop crossed the Dan in the last boat." -- p. 152
From: Prelude to Yorktown, the Southern Campaign of Nathanael Greene 1780-1781, by M. F. Treacy. Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press. 1963.
6.3 The race for the Dan was now on. The distance from Guilford was only seventy miles, but the season was still midwinter; it still rained and snowed intermittently. The roads, in a red-clay country, were frozen into a rough and broken surface at night, but by day softened into deep mud that clung to the wheels of the wagons, the hooves of the horses, and the feet of the men, so that yard after yard was gained only by an exhausting struggle.14
Williams and Cornwallis were on parallel roads, not far apart. At one time, when the British army had stretched out to the dangerous length of four miles, Cornwallis halted his van to bring up his rear and then pushed on with all possible speed, moving at times thirty miles a day, an almost inconceivable speed under the existing conditions. Williams had to travel as fast to keep ahead of the British. To guard against Cornwallis's making a detour and getting between the light troops and Greene's army, as well as to protect his own force from surprise, Williams had to send out such numerous patrols and establish such strong pickets that half of his force was always on night duty. He halted for only six hours each night; each man got only six hours rest in every forty-eight. They never set up a tent. "The heat of the fires was the only protection from rain and sometimes snow." 11 They started each day at three in the morning and hastened forward to gain a distance ahead of their pursuers that would give them time for breakfast - breakfast, dinner, and supper in one, because this was their only meal for the day. Cornwallis came on with equal speed.
In the afternoon of the 13th Cornwallis diverged from his line of march, taking a causeway that led him into the road that Williams's troops were following. According to custom, they had made their early morning march and were trying to roast their meat and bake their corn bread at fires dampened by the falling rain, when a countryman on a jaded, little pony came to tell them that the enemy was right behind, only four miles away.
Lee's Legion formed the rear guard of the light troops. Williams sent Lee back along the road to verify this information. The result was a clash with a troop of Tarleton's horse, in which eighteen of the enemy were slain and the rest put to flight. In this affair Lee's bugler, a lad of fourteen years, was cut down and killed in a manner that seems to have been wanton. In reprisal he declared his intention of hanging one of his prisoners, Captain Miller, and was deterred only by the near approach of the British van, which compelled him to hasten to rejoin Williams.
But Williams had decided that by now the British had been sufficiently misled as to the route taken by the main American army, and that Greene and Huger had had time to reach the Dan. Therefore, while Lee was engaging Tarleton's troop, he had taken a right-hand road leading to Irwin's Ferry, where he expected to find the main army. Lee's men, having missed their one meal of the day, took a byroad that would lead them to Williams and meanwhile give time to refresh themselves at a farmhouse. The byway was somewhat obscure, and Lee felt safe from immediate pursuit; but while the men and his horses were in the midst of their meal they heard shots in their rear. Cornwallis had discovered the short cut, and Lee's vedettes were signaling the near approach of the enemy's van.
Horses were hastily saddled. The infantry were sent on the run to cross a bridge over a swollen creek, while Lee, with the horse, rode back to support his vedettes. He checked the British advance long enough for the foot soldiers to cross the bridge, and then turned and galloped after them. The enemy's cavalry followed fast, but Lee's horses were superior. They got over the bridge, and there was a hot chase across a mile-wide plain before the fugitives gained a height along which ran the Irwin's Ferry road, and the pursuit ceased.
Cornwallis still hoped to catch them before they crossed the Dan. He followed fast. More than once O'Hara in the van was within musket shot of Lee's rear guard. More than once it seemed that the light troops must stand and fight. When they came to a creek or a ravine, the British cavalry would rush forward to attack them in the confusion of crossing, but they always got across in time. At last Lee caught up with Williams. It was growing dark, and the Americans hoped that the enemy would halt for the night; but Cornwallis still came on, determined to run them down. Night fell and they could not see the rough and rutted road they traveled; it was hard going for the weary men.
Williams put his horsemen in front to hurry the pace of the infantry. Then, suddenly, they came in sight of a line of fires--campfires. It was Greene's camp beyond a doubt! He had not got away, and the enemy were close upon him! When this thought flashed through their minds, they were heartbroken. All their struggles, all their hardships had been for naught. Now there was only one thing to do; they must face their pursuers and fight to give the main army a chance to get away.
But Williams had had a dispatch from Greene: "It is very evident that the enemy intend to push us over the river. . . . I sent off the baggage and stores with orders to cross as fast as they got to the river. The North Carolina militia have all deserted us, except about 80 men. . . . You have the flower of the army, don't expose the men too much, lest our situation grow more critical."
The date of the dispatch, February 13, and the place from which it was sent made him sure that Greene would, by this time, be farther on the way. He reassured his men and led them on to find that the fires were burning where Greene had camped two days before. Friendly hands had kept them alight for the benefit of the light troops.
But they could not stop to enjoy them. They kept on until news arrived from the rear that the British had halted. Then they paused for two or three hours, still a long distance from the river.
At midnight they were again afoot. In the morning came another dispatch from Greene, sent the same day as the last: "4 o'clock. Follow our route. I have not slept four hours since you left me, so great has been my solicitude to prepare for the worst."
They halted for an hour's rest and a hasty meal, started again, slogged through the mud, the enemy at their heels, and were still doggedly pushing on at noon when a courier met them, found Williams, gave him a note dated the night before: "Irwin's ferry, 12 past 5 o'clock. All our troops are over and the stage is clear. . . . I am ready to receive you and give you a hearty welcome." "
Williams gave out the news. The word ran back through the column, and cheer after cheer followed it. They shouted so loud that O'Hara's van heard them and knew that the game was up.
The reaction among the men was instantaneous. Their hearts were lifted, their strength renewed. For three hours more they hurried forward. They were now within fourteen miles of the river. Williams again detached Lee's cavalry to delay the enemy, while he took the rest of his command on to Irwin's Ferry. They got there before sunset, found the boats, and were ferried across. They had marched forty of the hardest miles that ever man traveled in about sixteen hours.
At dark, Lee's horsemen started after the others. Between eight and nine o'clock they got to the ferry, just as the boats returned from transporting Williams's troops. The men took to the boats; the horses swam. By midnight they were all across. They had hardly landed when the British van arrived at the river."
Cornwallis got the news in the course of the evening. The river was too high to cross without boats, and every boat was on the farther shore. Greene had won the race.
The War of the Revolution, Ward, pages 774-76
6.5 - Letter from General Greene to General Washington.
Camp, Irwin's Ferry, on the Dan River, 15 February, 1781.
Sir,
I wrote your Excellency at Guilford Court-house, giving you an account of our situation, and of the measures advised by the Council of War, since which time we have been maneuvering constantly in the face of the enemy, who pressed our rear every day. Finding our numbers and condition so unequal to the enemy, that it would be too hazardous to risk a general action, and being pressed in point of time to get off our stores and baggage, notwithstanding I had ordered it to file off for Hillsborough when the army began their march from Pedee, and the stores from Hillsborough to cross the Roanoke the moment I could satisfy Myself that it was the intention of Lord Cornwallis to penetrate the upper country, - to gain time to effect this business, as well as give the militia an opportunity to collect, I found it necessary to form as strong a covering party as possible, which was commanded by Colonel Williams, who had orders to keep as near the enemy as he could, without exposing the party too much, and retard their march all in his power. His conduct upon the occasion does him the highest honor. Lord Cornwallis has been at our heels from day to day ever since we left Guilford; and our movements from thence to this place have been of the most critical kind, having a river in our front, and the enemy in our rear. But, happily, we have crossed without the loss of either men or stores. Much credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington on this occasion. The enemy are on the other side of the river, and, as it is falling, I expect it will be fordable before night; and the fords are so numerous, and the enemy lie in such an advantageous situation for crossing, that it would be a folly to think of defending them, as it would reduce our force to small parties; which might prove our ruin. The miserable situation of the troops, for want of clothing, has rendered the march the most painful imaginable, several hundreds of the soldiers tracking the ground with their bloody feet. Your feelings for the suffering soldier, had you been here, must have been pained upon the occasion. The enemy's movements have been so rapid, and the country under such terror, that few or no militia have joined us, and the greater part we had have fallen off. Inclosed I send your Excellency the strength of the British army, which you will see is much stronger than I had calculated upon in my last. This account I believe may be depended Upon, though I have not a shilling of money to obtain intelligence, notwithstanding my application to Maryland for money for this particular service; and your Excellency knows that good intelligence is the soul of an army, and ought to govern all its movements. I have done every thing to call out the militia of the upper country, and have kept Governors Nash and Jefferson as regularly advised of the state of matters, as time and circumstances would permit. Nothing is yet done to give me effectual support; and I am not a little apprehensive that it is out of the power of Virginia and North Carolina to afford it. I must repeat again what I have said in several letters, that I fear nothing can save the Southern States but a good regular army; and I am more confirmed of the importance of the cavalry upon this occasion than ever I have been, though strongly impressed with it before. Should Lord Cornwallis cease his pursuit after this army, I imagine he will file off for Halifax; and endeavour to establish a post there; to prevent which I have sent Colonel Kosciuszko to fortify it. That position would greatly awe Virginia, and almost totally subject North Carolina. If we can prevent his taking post there, and oblige him to fall down into the lower country, he will reap little advantage from his movements. I wish it was in my power to give Your Excellency more flattering accounts from this quarter; but I fear, unless reinforcements come from the northward, this will prove a devoted country. However, myutmost exertions shall be continued to save these States, and I shall be happy, if my conduct meets with your approbation, as my situation affords me no prospect of personal glory. Lieutenant-Colonel Lee made a charge upon the enemy's advanced party, a few days since and cut off the greater part of them. A captain and several privates were made prisoners. The enemy move with great caution; though with great rapidity, frequently performing marches of thirty miles a day. Myself and my aids are most worn out with fatigue, which prevents my giving you more frequent and particular accounts of our movements. Our army are in good spirits, notwithstanding their sufferings and excessive fatigue. I have had no further accounts from Wilmington or the Baron Steuben since I wrote.
I am, with great respect, yours, & c.,
NATHANAEL GREENE
7.1 Calendar & Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781 Page 189
13 February. [skirmish] Road to Dix’s Ferry (Rockingham County, N.C.) As part of the American army’s rear guard, Lee’s Legion took an out of the way detour, separate from Williams’ route, in order to avail himself of the plenty present at a nearby farm. Shortly after his men and horses were set up to be fed their breakfast (on the 12th), the shots of his pickets announced the approach of the van of the British army, under Brig. Gen. Charles O’Hara. Lee made immediate arrangements to get his men to safety, while the British were as surprised by his presence as he was by theirs. He rushed to secure a bridge that was key to the escape of his corps, and was thereby able to get his infantry across the nearby stream in time to effect their escape, with his cavalry covering their retreat. The British then continued their pursuit, often being in clear sight of Lee in the course of the day. Lee, thus just narrowly, managed to evade their approaches, and moved along the road to Dix’s, and after that to Boyd’s Ferry.
• There are so many good quotes in these Papers of Nathanael Greene, it would be a shame not to make a movie like they did at Guilford Courthouse. Here's another good one:
To Colonel Otho H. Williams: Irwin's Ferry [Va., 14 February 1781] 1/2 past 5 o'clock.
All our troops are over, and the stage is clear. The infantry will cross here, the horse below. Major Hardman has posted his party in readiness on this [the south] side, and the infantry and artillery are posted on the other, and I am ready to receive and give you a hearty welcome.
1. William Gordon provided the date of the excerpt in his history. Contrary to the impression given in some accounts of the retreat, the Dan River at Irwin's Ferry is not the border between North Carolina and Virginia; it is some ten miles inside Virginia. (See, for example, Treacy, Yorktown, p. 152.)
2. According to Gordon, NG himself waited to cross the Dan with Williams's troops. They arrived during the night, after a march of nearly forty miles that day. (Gordon, History, 4: 45; Lee, Memoirs, 1: 292-93) The pursuing British van, according to its commander, did not reach the ferry until about twelve hours after the Americans had finished crossing. (Gen. Charles O'Hara to the Duke of Grafton, 20 April, SCHGM 65 [1964]: 176) Summing up the retreat, NG's aide Ichabod Burnet wrote on 15 February that the Southern Army, which had been "hard pushed [and] obliged to march from twenty to thirty miles a day," was now "safe over the river and... laughing at the enemy who are on the opposite bank." (Burnet to Benjamin Walker, PHi)
• Wagons and Watercraft during the War for Independence - Part I, Part II
• Ferriage Research - Court Records
• "After arriving at Philadelphia, Pickering on 31 August advised Lt. Col. Henry Dearborn, deputy quartermaster with the main army, that thirty teams were bringing boats. He directed that the carpenters were to repair any damages the boats might have sustained. For this purpose Deputy Quartermaster Neilson was sending a few barrels of tar. Pickering ordered that fifteen of the best boat carriages be selected, disassembled, and put on board the boats, to be forwarded, with such troops as could be carried, to Christiana Bridge. From there all the boats could then be carried overland to Head of Elk in two trips; if only ten boat carriages could be used, three trips would do the job. To prevent delay in putting the boat carriages back together, he directed that all the parts of a particular carriage were to be marked alike. Wagonmaster Thomas Cogswell's branding iron, he suggested, would be most convenient for marking."
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