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Exhibit Project R & D Planning Page - Segment 3
Reference: • The National Park Service Web site for The Battle of Cowpens 3.1 Into this conflict, General George Washington sent the very capable Nathanael Greene to take command of the Southern army. Against military custom, Greene, just two weeks into his command, split his army, sending General Daniel Morgan southwest of the Catawba River to cut supply lines and hamper British operations in the backcountry, and, in doing so "spirit up the people". General Cornwallis, British commander in the South, countered Greene’s move by sending Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton to block Morgan’s actions. Tarleton was only twenty-six, but he was an able commander, both feared and hated – hated especially for his victory at the Waxhaws. There, Tarleton was said to have continued the fight against remnants of the Continental Army trying to surrender. His refusal, tradition says, of offering no quarter, led to the derisive term "Tarleton’s Quarter". On May 29, a1780, Tarleton’s Legion overtook and defeated Colonel Abraham Buford and his Third Virginia Continentals as they returned through the Waxhaws area toward North Carolina after the fall of Charleston. (Known also today as Buford’s massacre) (From The Battle of Cowpens By: Scott Withrow, Park Ranger, Cowpens National Park) 3.1A “Greene’s army reached the camp site at the mouth of Hick’s Creek, a tributary of the Pee Dee, on December 26, 1780.” -- p.69 “ … to guard against the contingency of being unable to choose his line of retreat, Greene employed the versatile Kosciuszko in building flat-bottomed boats which could be fitted on wheels and transported with the army. That is to say, they could be so transported if ever Greene could procure the horses to transport them.” – p. 70 “An incessant rain fell all through the day and night of February 1. From the meticulous care he had taken to familiarize himself with every aspect of the southern country, Greene knew that a rise of the rivers could be expected about two days after such a downpour. He was therefore most anxious that Morgan should cross the Yadkin before February 3. As the general hastened on from Salisbury to the river, it became obvious that not only were the militia afraid to embody, but that the inhabitants of the district were so terrified at the approach of the British that they were prepared to abandon their homes and trust their possessions to the protection of the American army. The road became increasingly obstructed by the wagons of the fugitives. Nevertheless, Morgan and Greene and the army succeeded in crossing the river. They were encamped on the opposite shore by the evening of February 3, thanks to the foresight with which Greene had ordered Kosciuszko’s boats up to the Trading Ford.” – p.140-141 “With Morgan out of the picure, the command of the light corps devolved upon Colonel Otho Holland Williams, a gentleman as versatile as he was charming. On February 10 Greene and the main army left Guilford Court House, pursuing the direct route to the lower Dan. Kosciuszko preceded them with a small party prepared to protect the boats secured at the river and to throw up a light breastwork at the ferry to cover the passage of the army.” – p. 149 From: Prelude to Yorktown, the Southern Campaign of Nathanael Greene 1780-1781, by M. F. Treacy. Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press. 1963. 3.2 Cornwallis' Plan for Catching up with Greene "The unfortunate affair of the 17th of January was a very unexpected and severe blow; for, besides reputation, our loss did not fall short of six hundred men: However, being thoroughly sensible that defensive measures would be certain ruin to the affairs of Britain in the southern colonies, this event did not deter me from prosecuting the original plan. That General Greene might be uncertain of my intended route as long as possible, I had left General Leslie at Camden, until I was ready to move from Wynnesborough, and he was not within a day's march of me: I employed the 18th (a.) in forming a junction with him, and in collecting the remains of Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's corps; after which, great exertions were made by part of the army, without baggage, to retake our prisoners, and to intercept General Morgan's corps on its retreat to the Catawba; but the celerity of their movements, and the swelling of numberless creeks in our way, rendered all our efforts fruitless. I therefore assembled the army on the 25th (b.) at Ramfoure's mill, on the fourth fork of the Catawba; and as the loss of my light troops could only be remedied by the activity of the whole corps, I employed a halt of two days in collecting flour, and in destroying superfluous baggage, and all my waggons, except those loaded with hospital stores, salt, and ammunition, and four revered empty in readiness for sick or wounded. In this measure, though at the expence of a great deal of officers' baggage, and of all prospect in future of rum, and even a regular supply of provisions to the soldiers, I must, in justice to the army, say, that there was the most general and cheerful acquiescence. In the mean time the rains had rendered the north Catawba impassable; and General Morgan's corps, the militia of the rebellious counties of Rowan and Mecklenburg under General Davidson, or the gang of plunderers usually under the command of General Sumpter, not then recovered from his wounds, had occupied all the fords in a space of more than forty miles upward form the fork. During its height, I approached the river by short marches, so as to give the enemy equal apprehensions for several fords; and after having procured the best information in my power, I resolved to attempt the passage at a private ford, then slightly guarded, near M'Cowan's ford, on the morning of the 1st of February." Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, March 17th, 1781 • Cornwallis was infuriated by this disaster, and, ridding himself of his heavy luggage and whatever might impede his progress, at once set out in active pursuit of Morgan, in a most brilliant march Greene effected a junction of the two divisions of his army at Guilford Court House on 9 February, 1781. He had expected here to meet re-enforcements from Virginia, but, as they had not yet arrived, he thought it best to retreat toward them and put the broad stream of the Dan between himself and the enemy. 3.2 Benjamin Franklin's Newspaper Account of the Battle of Cowpens 1781 February 14, 1781 The Pennsylvania Gazette PHILADELPHIA, February 8.[...] General MORGAN'S Letter to General GREEN. Camp, near Cain Creek, January 19, 1781. Dear Sir, “THE troops I have the honour to command have gained a compleat victory over a detachment from the British army, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Tarleton. The action happened on the 17th instant, about sunrise, at a place called the Cowpens, near Pacolet River. “On the 14th, having received intelligence that the British army were in motion, and that their movements clearly indicated their intention of dislodging me, I abandoned my encampment at Grendales Ford, and on the 16th, in the evening, took possession of a post about seven miles from the Cherokee Ford, on Broad River. My former position subjected me at once to the operations of Lord Cornwallis and Col. Tarleton, and in case of a defeat my retreat might easily have been cut off. My situation at the Cowpens enabled me to improve any advantages that I might gain, and to provide better for my security, should I be unfortunate. These reasons induced me to take this post, notwithstanding it had the appearance of a retreat. On the evening of the 16th the enemy occupied the ground we had removed from in the morning. An hour before daylight one of my scouts informed me that they had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information the necessary dispositions were made, and, from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them. The light infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, and the Virginia militia under Major Triplett, were formed on a rising ground; the third regiment of dragoons, consisting of about 80 men, under the command of Lieut. Col. Washington, were so posted in their rear, as not to be injured by the enemyfire, and yet to be able to charge them, should an occasion offer; the volunteers from North Carolina , South Carolina and Georgia, under the command of Colonel Pickens, were posted to guard the flanks; Major McDowal, of the North Carolina volunteers was posted on the right flank, in front of the line 150 yards; Major Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front; Colonels Brannons and Thomas, of the South Carolina volunteers, on the right of Major McDowal; and Colonels Hayes and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Major Cunningham; Captains Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta riflemen, were to support the right of the line. “The enemy drew up in one line, 400 yards in front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th to our left, the Legion Infantry to our centre, and two companies of light troops of 100 each on our flanks. In their front they moved two pieces of artillery, and Lieut Col. Tarleton, with 280 cavalry, was posted in the rear of his line. The disposition being thus made, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy, on which their whole line advanced with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. Majors McDowal and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for their support; the whole of Col. Pickenscommand then kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeable to orders. When the enemy advanced to our line, they received a well directed and incessant fire, but their numbers being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position. We retired in good order about fifty paces, formed, advanced on the enemy, and gave them a brisk fire, which threw them into disorder. Lieutenant Colonel Howard observing this, gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address that the enemy fled with the utmost precipitation. Lieut. Colonel Washington discovering that the cavalry were cutting down our riflemen on the left, charged them with such firmness as obliged them to retire in confusion. The enemy were entirely routed, and the pursuit continued upwards of 20 miles. Our loss was inconsiderable, not having more than 12 killed and 60 wounded. The enemy loss was 10 commissioned officers, and upwards of 100 rank and file killed, 200 wounded, 29 commissioned officers, and above 500 privates, prisoners, which fell into our hands, with two pieces of artillery, two standards, eight hundred muskets, one travelling forge, thirty five baggage waggons, seventy Negroes, and upwards of one hundred dragoon horses, with all their music. They destroyed most of their baggage, which was immense. “Although our success was compleat, we fought only eight hundred men, and were opposed by upwards of one thousand of chosen British troops. “Such was the inferiority of our numbers, that our success must be attributed, under God, to the justice of our cause, and the bravery of our troops. My wishes would induce me to mention the name of every private centinel in the corps. In justice to the bravery and good conduct of the officers, I have taken the liberty to inclose you a list of their names, from a conviction that you will be pleased to introduce such characters to the world. “Major Giles, my Aid de Camp, and Captain Brooks, acting as my Brigade Major, deserve and have my thanks, for their assistance and behaviour on this occasion. The Baron de Glabuck, who accompanies Major Giles with these dispatches, served with me as a volunteer, and behaved in such a manner as to merit your attention. I am, Sir, your obedient Servant, DAN. MORGAN.” |
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