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Exhibit Project R & D Planning Page - Segment 2
"Although the British could explain their shift in focus from North to South by citing the practical need to locate their troops in a more flexible position relative to their other major conflicts around the globe, many historians believe the move South truly signified the frustrated effort to quell the resistance in the North. Unable to halt the progress of the revolution through direct conflict in the geographical center of the rebellion, the British moved south, planning to take the hardest possible route back to the North. British military officials decided on a move to the South as a last-ditch effort at victory, expecting that the greater presence of loyalists in the region would make it easier to conquer and hold their military targets." Commentary from The War in The South-After 1778 2.1 Spring 1780 – Victories against the British troops had been few. George Washington became so despondent that he wrote, “Unless there is a material change both in our civil and our military policy, it will be in vain to contend much longer.” Almost every attempt at arms or diplomacy met with failure. 2.1A "The exiled Loyalist governor of North Carolina had devised a plan to regain control of his state. He planned to gather an army, march to the sea, and link up with British Naval forces. The combined army would then crush the rebellion in the South. On February 27, 1776, while enroute to the sea, the governor's British Loyalists and local Patriots met at the Battle of Moores Creek (Moores Creek National Battlefield). The battle was an overwhelming victory for the Patriots. The British Loyalists were never able to reach the sea. Unable to complete their rendezvous assignment, the British ships sailed south to Charleston, South Carolina. When the ships attempted to enter the harbor, they discovered that the Colonials had constructed a dirt-and-palmetto log fort (Fort Moultrie National Monument). During the ensuing battle, the British fleet suffered another defeat at the hands of the Colonials. Following these two battles the focus of the war shifted to the north. Battles were fought over cities such as New York, Trenton, Saratoga, and Boston. By the late 1770s, the war in the north was stalemated with neither side able to gain the advantage. The British commanders decided that the war could still be won in the south. In 1778 the British captured Savannah, Georgia, and in 1780 captured Charleston, South Carolina. American forces under Horatio Gates were defeated at Camden, South Carolina. Cornwallis then took possession of Camden and Ninety Six (Ninety Six National Historic Site). This left the way clear for Cornwallis to pursue his goals of gathering southern Loyalists and taking the war to Virginia. He planned then to use his southern ports to move men and material into the interior of North and South Carolina. In late 1780, Cornwallis moved his forces into North Carolina. He assigned Major Ferguson to command Loyalist troops on his left flank. Ferguson placed his army at Kings Mountain, South Carolina (Kings Mountain National Military Park) to await the arrival of the enemy. On October 7, 1780, Major Ferguson's militia was defeated by Patriot militia in a battle where pleas of surrender were ignored. Hearing of the defeat, Cornwallis retreated to Winnsborough for the winter. The remains of the American army were placed under the command of Nathaniel Greene. Greene divided his army, sending Daniel Morgan into western Carolina. Cornwallis countered, and dispatched Banastre Tarleton and his dragoons to destroy Morgan's army. On January 17, 1781, the two forces met at Cowpens, South Carolina (Cowpens National Battlefield). Morgan skillfully deployed his forces and devastatingly defeated the British. " Text taken from from The National Parks Service - Links to the Past • Cowpens National Battlefield • Fort Moultrie National Monument • Guilford Courthouse National Military Park • Kings Mountain National Military Park • Moores Creek National Battlefield • Ninety Six National Historic Site • Natchez National Historical Park 2.2 Disaster followed disaster in the South. British forces captured Charleston, South Carolina on May 12, 1780 and with it, virtually all the Continental troops and their supplies. 2.3 From the Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge (On February 27, 1777, patriot militia defeated a larger force of Loyalists. The battle was crucial because it ended royal authority in North Carolina and delayed a full-scale British invasion of the South.)on, the British had made early and mostly futile efforts in the South, including a failed naval expedition to take Charleston in 1776. Such victories boosted Patriot morale and blunted British efforts, but, by 1779-80, with stalemate in the North, British strategists again looked south. They came south for a number of reasons, primarily to assist Southern Loyalists and help them regain control of colonial governments, and then push north, to crush the rebellion. They estimated that many of the population would rally to the Crown. 2.4 Cornwallis' Sothern Strategy: - My plan for the winter's campaign was to penetrate into North Carolina, leaving South Carolina in security against any probable attack in my absence. - I hoped in my way to be able to destroy or drive out of South Carolina the corps of the enemy commanded by General Morgan, which threatened our valuable district of ninety Six: And I likewise hoped, by rapid marches to get between General Greene and Virginia, and by that means force him to fight without receiving any reinforcement from that province; Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, March 17th, 1781 • Reference: The War in the South • Map: Operations in the Carolinas showing the Crossing • Map: Cornwallis establishes forts in South Carolina • Map: Greene's Troop Movements including the Crossing 2.5 General Greene started for the south - November 1780 General Greene accepted the southern command with eagerness, supported by the confidence of Washington. General La Fayette desired to accompany him; but in view of his intimate relations to the French alliance, his services were deemed essential to successful operations at the north. General Greene started for the south. There was breadth of territory sufficient to satisfy any reasonable ambition; but he needed an army. He resolved to develop an army, in accordance with the peculiar kind of service which would be required, and his suggestion was approved by Washington when he first submitted his plan on the eighth of November, 1780. He would have that army a "flying army," lightly equipped, mobile, and as familiar as possible with the country in which operations were to be prosecuted. The Commander-in-chief addressed letters to Governor Thomas S. Lee of Maryland, to Governor Abner Nash of North Carolina, and to Governor Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, invoking their cordial cooperation in the work of the new Department commander. The southern army, as Greene wrote to General Knox, "is shadow rather than substance, having only an imaginary existence." Congress could not supply troops; but by the adding of Maryland and Delaware to his department, he secured the control of militia, additional to that which he was to draw from the actual field of operations. He was also clothed with the same powers which General Gates had been empowered to exercise, such as authority to draw upon the Southern States for troops or money and to impress subsistence or transportation, whenever unavoidable necessity should require it. On the twenty-third of November he began his journey, attended by General the Baron Steuben and his aids Colonel Morris and Major Burnet. At each State capital he urged the necessity of immediate action. To Governor Rodney of Delaware, he wrote:-"Do not suffer those States, now struggling with the enemy, to sink under their oppression, for want of a reasonable support." To Governor Lee, of Maryland:-"Unless they are soon succored and countenanced by a good regular force, their distresses will inevitably break their spirits, and they will be compelled to reconcile themselves to their misfortunes. There is no alternative but base submission, or an effectual prosecution of the war." Generals Gist and Smallwood were at once employed by these two States, upon recruiting service. General Greene's order of November twentieth, thus gives clearness to his will,-"You will please to make all your applications in writing, that they may appear hereafter for our justification ; that we left nothing unessayed to promote the public service. Let your applications be as pressing as our necessities are urgent; after which, if the northern States are lost, we shall stand justified. The greatest consequences depend upon your activity and zeal in the business." Upon reaching Virginia, he found that the State was necessarily absorbed in its own defense. General Leslie had taken possession of Norfolk and Portsmouth, and fortified both. Generals Muhlenberg and Weedon, had been sent by Washington to organize the militia, and upon General Greene's arrival they were organizing their forces to oppose any advance of General Leslie beyond the immediate limits of the two posts which his army garrisoned. The consolidation of regiments and the reduction of their number, left several valuable officers out of service; but nearly all of these, as well as Generals Muhlenberg and Weedon, had served under General Greene at the north. Among the officers thus left without commands was Colonel Edward Carrington. The first thing General Greene determined upon was "to select depots, and laboratories, -posts of rest and communication, and to provide transportation for hospital and other army stores." Justice Johnson states that "he fixed his eye upon Colonel Carrington as eminently qualified to undertake the task of combining and conducting the means at the Quartermaster-general's department ; that he obeyed the call to the office and discharged it with unequaled zeal and fidelity." Chief-justice Marshall confirms the statement. The principal depot of stores and arms was established at Prince Edward Court House, and General the Baron Steuben was charged with maintaining the supply of powder from the manufactories, and of lead from the mines in Fincastle County. He was also placed in command of the District of Virginia, with a special charge "to collect, organize, discipline and expedite the recruits for the Southern army." Before his departure for the field General Greene wrote to Governor Jefferson, urging the immediate completion of the regiments, under the reduced standard, to their maximum ; and makes the following points emphatic: "It is perfectly consistent, in all cases, to carry on war abroad, rather than at home, as well in matters of expense, as in humanity to the inhabitants. But this policy is rendered doubly necessary to Virginia, from the ease with which the enemy can penetrate through North Carolina and possess themselves of all the low country of Virginia. . . It must be the extreme of folly to hazard our liberties upon so precarious a dependence," referring to the militia. "They are the bulwark of civil liberty if they are not depended upon, as a principal, but employed as an auxiliary." "Officers are the very soul of an army, and you may as well attempt to animate a dead body into action, as to expect to employ an army to advantage, when the officers are not perfectly easy in their circumstances, and happy in the service." In the sphere of Logistics which so materially affects all military operations, General Greene had peculiar experience, and he evinced great discrimination and practical judgment. In this letter to Governor Jefferson, he says: "The late distressing accounts from the Southern army claim the immediate attention of government, both with respect to provisions and clothing. It is impossible for men to remain long in the field unless they are well furnished with both these articles ; and to expose them to the want of either, will soon transfer them from the field to the hospital, or lay them under the necessity of deserting." . . . " Great pains should be taken to fix upon some place for feeding the army with live stock, and I think of none unless it be putting up a large quantity of beeves to stall-feed." . . . " The distress and suffering of the people of North and South Carolina deserve the most speedy support to keep alive that spirit of enterprise which has prevailed among them lately, so much to their honor. It is much easier to oppose the enemy while the tide of sentiment runs in our favor, than it will be to secure Virginia after they are overrun." Orders were issued to Colonel Carrington "to explore the Dan, Yadkin and Catawba, and make himself thoroughly acquainted with the streams into which they discharged themselves." This order was executed with great exactness, and the casual reader of general history who has regarded the subsequent movements of General Greene as accidental, will see that a previous knowledge of the country in which he was to operate was one element of his military success. Colonel Carrington accompanied General Greene to Richmond after the organization of his department. General Stevens executed the survey of the Yadkin. Kosciusko, Greene's engineer-in-chief, examined the Catawba, and other officers visited the Dan. The result of this forethought materially affected the subsequent campaign. However, as southern commander Gates showed himself, if not a brilliant, at least a conscientious and responsible leader. It was he, not Greene, who first dispatched Carrington to look into the crossings on the Roanoke, a measure which laid the foundation for the preserving of Greene’s army in the Race to the Dan. Lee's Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department (1869 edition) Page 249-250 Lieut. Col. Edward Carrington, 1st Continental artillery (Virginia), Quartermaster General for the Southern Army Carrington, with the 1st Continental artillery met up with de Kalb in Virginia on the latter’s march into North Carolina. However, due to a dispute with his superior Col. Charles Harrison, Carrington withdrew from his command. When Gates arrived to take charge of the army, he sent Carrington to Virginia to inquire into the availability of crossings on the Roanoke River, which Greene extended to the Dan River. Greene appointed Carrington his Quartermaster General in which capacity he served admirably. He did actually join Greene's army till 7 February 1781, about which time he was soon employed in collecting the boats for Greene’s subsequent passage at Irwin’s and Boyd’s ferries on the Dan River. In March through May, he led the American negotiations with Cornwallis for the exchange of prisoners, while continuing to carry out his functions as quartermaster. One of his last actions while with the southern army was securing 200 horses from North Carolina for Greene. In July he went into Virginia for the purposes of obtaining more supplies, but ended up serving with Washington’s army at Yorktown. After that he returned south and resumed his duties as Greene’s quartermaster. Calendar & Record 1780 - 82, Page 19 On the second of December, General Greene reached Charlotte, and immediately relieved General Gates of the command, under circumstances which redounded to the credit of both officers. Mutual courtesies were exchanged, and General Gates went to his farm. The condition of his army was General Greene's first care. He found that everything was needed, and in a letter to Governor Jefferson, states quite clearly the facts. A few paragraphs are given: "I find the troops in a most wretched condition, destitute of everything necessary either for comfort or convenience, and may literally be said to be naked." " It will answer no good purpose to send men here in such a condition." "There must be either pride or principle, to make a soldier. No man will think himself bound to fight the battles of a state that leaves him to perish for want of clothing, nor can you inspire a soldier with the sentiment of pride while his situation renders him more an object of pity than of envy. The life of a soldier in the best estate, is liable to innumerable hardships; but where these are aggravated by the want of provisions and clothing, his condition becomes intolerable; nor can men long contend with such complicated difficulties and distress. Death, desertion, and the hospital must soon swallow up an army under such circumstances, and if it were possible for men to maintain such a wretched existence, they would have no spirit to face their enemies, and would inevitably disgrace themselves and their commander. It is impossible to presume discipline when troops are in want of everything; to attempt severity will only thin the ranks by a more hasty desertion." For two months General Greene remained in camp. He anticipated the necessity for axes, and even nails, and fabricated cheap substitutes for articles that could not be readily secured otherwise. On the twentieth of December, having been delayed four days by rains, the huts at Charlotte were abandoned, the main army reaching Hicks creek, a branch of the Peedee, near Cheraw Hill, on the twenty-sixth. General Morgan was detached, however, on the sixteenth, with three hundred and twenty from the Maryland line, two hundred Virginia militia, and Colonel Washington's horse, less than a hundred strong, to cross the Catawba, and "take command in that quarter, to act offensively or defensively, to protect the country, spirit up the people, annoy the enemy, collect provisions and forage, form magazines, prevent plundering, etc." Marion at once placed himself in communication with General Greene. In a letter to that officer, responsive to one addressed to General Gates, he says, "Your letter of the 22d last month to General Gates is before me. I am fully sensible your service is hard and sufferings great; but how great the prize for which we contend. I like your plan of frequently shifting your ground. It frequently prevents a surprise, and perhaps the total loss of your party. Until a more permanent army can be collected than is in the field at present, we must endeavor to keep up a partisan war, and preserve the tide of sentiment among the people in our favor as much as possible. Spies are the eyes of an army, and without them a general is always groping in the dark." Marion was then on Black River, but soon returned to his camp in the forks of Pedee and Lynch Rivers, and on the twenty-seventh of December reported to General Greene the arrival of General Leslie at Charleston, his march to Camden, and the establishment of Colonel Watson at Nelson's Ferry with two hundred men. From that time forward the campaign was fairly in motion. With Morgan on the west and Marion in the eastern districts, the new commanding officer had carefully prepared his way to contend with the British forces in a manner of warfare which should suit itself to the character of his troops, and the country in which the war was to be carried on. It is very clear from the unofficial letters of General Greene to La Fayette and other officers, that he realized the grave responsibilities of his position and endeavored to anticipate the contingencies of the campaign. A reference to chapter thirty-six will show that at that early period of the war, he understood the importance of preparing in advance for an army movement; and as already indicated, much of his success at the south was secured by the tedious system of reconnoitring which he inaugurated before he marched from Virginia. Other troops followed slowly. The patience of Baron Steuben was severely tasked. On the fifteenth of December Colonel Lee marched with his corps, three hundred strong, and Colonel Christopher Greene accompanied him with four hundred men, but they did not reach the Peedee until the twelfth of January. The closing active campaign of the war for American Independence thus opened, and its principal military events will be considered in detail. (Pages 528 - 533) Battles of the American Revolution 1775 - 1781, Henry B. Carrington, original publication 1881 2.6 Greene Splits His Army - "the most audacious and ingenious piece of military strategy of the war." With such troops as he had, in such a wretched condition, Greene could not hope to offer battle to Cornwallis. He must wait until they were refitted and reenforced. Yet he must not appear to retreat before the expected advance of his opponent from Winnsboro, lest he increase the confidence of his enemy, lower the spirits of his own men, and dishearten the people of the country, who looked to him for defense and would be valuable to him if they believed in him. But, as Cheraw Hill was more distant from the enemy than Charlotte, a removal to that point would look like a retreat and hence have the undesirable effect he wished to avoid. He must carry on some encouraging operations that would not incur the danger of a general engagement. Such operations must, in short, be partisan in nature, threatening Cornwallis's flanks, interrupting his communications, cutting off his supplies, and at the same time animating Marion, Sumter, and Pickens with their partisan bands to similar enterprises. To meet the situation, Greene made a daring decision; he decided to divide his already insufficient army. The decision was opposed to the classic rules of warfare: to divide an inferior force in the face of a superior enemy was to invite that enemy to destroy first one and then the other of the parts. There had been examples enough of the impropriety of such a division in this very war: Washington splitting his army at New York and Long Island in August, 1776; Howe scattering his Hessians in New Jersey in December, 1776; Burgoyne sending his Hessians to defeat at Bennington in August, 1777; Washington allowing Lafayette to take post at Barren Hill in May, 1778. The most recent example was Ferguson at King's Mountain. Every one of these, except Barren Hill, had resulted in disaster; and Lafayette had escaped from Barren Hill only by the skin of his teeth. To divide so vastly inferior a force as Greene's at Charlotte might seem to be suicidal. On the other hand, there were excellent reasons, even compelling reasons, to disregard the classic rule and fit the strategy of the moment to the inescapable actual conditions. The ability to do that is the hallmark of a really great general. Greene saw that, by separating his army into two parts, he made it easier for both to subsist on the country, living on the very regions from which the British drew their supplies; and that if Cornwallis later should take the natural route back into South Carolina he would find a fighting force on each of his flanks. If he turned against the left-hand American force, that on the right might attack Charleston; if against the right-hand force, Ninety-six and Augusta would be exposed to that on the left. If he made no movement, the intended harassment of his army could be better effected. As to the danger of either division being attacked and defeated, Greene relied upon the mobility of the Americans to escape from the more encumbered, slower British. So, with all those reasons to justify him, he carried out his plan, "the most audacious and ingenious piece of military strategy of the war." The proof of its validity was that it worked. Before Cowpens, pages 750 & 751 The War of the Revolution, by Christopher Ward, 1952 "Yet Greene's most memorable generalship was seen the "Race to the Dan" phase of the Guilford Court House campaign: praised by British as well as American commanders." Calendar & Record 1780 - 81, Page 16 |
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